Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Monday, 5 March 2012

Eastern times in transition


"While there's still time, I would like to make a grand journey across Eastern Europe. To Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the former East Germany, and back to Belgium." (Akerman, in Anderson, 2009)
Akerman documents her journey from the end of summer to deepest winter, for D'Est/From the East reconstructing "her impressions in the manner of a documentary on the border of fiction" [Icarus Films, 2012].

Akerman, Chantal (2008) Chantal Akerman: Moving through Time and Space. [Online]
 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/592 [04/03/2012]
Anderson, Melissa (2009) Eastern Promisses [Online]
http://artforum.com/film/id=23865 [04/03/2012]
Icarus Films [2012] From The East D'Est [Online]
 http://homevideo.icarusfilms.com/new2003/from.html [04/03/2012]

Thursday, 16 February 2012

Architecture and memory in films



Brutalität in Stein [Brutality in Stone] (1961) by Alexander Kluge connects history and memory through architecture and speeches by Hitler. Kluge has also directed Abschied von Gestern/Yesterday Girl (1966)  about a an East German refugee trying and failing to get a foothold in West Berlin (Lee, 2010). The film opens with the text "what separates us from yesterday is not a rift but a changed position".


bluaCONVAIR880 (2011) 1 - Abschied von gestern - 1966 - Kluge [Online]
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MMa5TvLpPVA [14/02/2012]
Brody, Richard (2010) The Way West. [Online]
 http://www.newyorker.com/arts/events/revivals/2010/05/24/100524gomo_GOAT_movies_brody [13/02/2012]
dekonstrukcija (2010) Brutalitat in Stein - 1961 - Alexander Kluge & Peter Schamoni. [Online] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=islUtYwOOx8 [13/02/2012]
Lee, Kevin B. (2010) 993 (129). Abschied von Gestern—(Anita G.) / Yesterday Girl (1966, dir. Alexander Kluge) [Online] http://www.slantmagazine.com/house/2010/01/993-129-abschied-von-gestern%E2%80%94anita-g-yesterday-girl-1966-dir-alexander-kluge/ [14/02/2012]

Wednesday, 7 December 2011

Thomas Demand's National Gallery



Thomas Demand creates "a strudel of putting sculptures and photographs and concerns of painting into one" by constructing life-size scenes to photograph. He talks about his exhibition National Gallery which coincides with the anniversaries of the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the opening the Wall, "two pivotal historical events in German history" (This is Tomorrow, 2009). Focusing on the collective memory of Germany, Demand describes his intention to capture "society falling apart and a new one forming" (Demand, in Bound, 2011) through a raided Stasi office. 

Office (1995)
"The tacit nature of this work's Germanness is striking. Imagine walking through an exhibition by Joseph Beuys devoted to the idea of the German nation without having to notice that this is the theme. Impossible. For Gerhard Richter, even more impossible. With Sigmar Polke, Hanne Darboven, Anselm Kiefer, Isa Genzken or Martin Kippenberger--for any of the photographers of the Becher school, too--a reflection on Germany and the traces of its history in the present could only be patent, unavoidable. Is this Demand's lesson: that Germany is now no different from anyplace else, that it is at last a normal, self-confident European nation like any other, unburdened of the memory of its historic tragedies, free of the guilt and resentment that have weighed so heavily on Demand's precursors? Has the effort of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past), a process as cumbersome as the word, been completed, or has it simply fizzled out?" (Schwabsky, 2009) 
"...What counts as destruction, and what counts as 'ours,' depends on your viewpoint. In 2002 the German Parliament voted to demolish the Palast der Republik, the grandiose seat of the former East German Parliament... It had been closed since 1990, and the idea was to replace it with a replica of the kaiser's castle that had once occupied the spot. The German Parliament sought to efface part of Berlin's living history in favor of sham historicism. Nothing that belonged to the GDR, according to powerful elements in Germany today, could possibly be 'ours.'" (Schwabsky, 2009) 
Bound, Robert (2011) News Report: Thomas Demand. [Online]
Schwabsky, Barry (2009) A Makeshift World: On Thomas Demand. [Online]
This is Tomorrow (2009) Thomas Demand: Nationalgalerie. [Online]
 [07/12/2011]

Illner, Peer [2011] Demand's Politics of Paper. [Online]
 http://introducingart.com/ISSUE%206/CONCEIVE/Peer%20Illner.html [06/12/2011]
MoMA [2011] Thomas Demand [Online]
 http://www.moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/116 [06/12/2011]
Tate Channel (2008) Meet the Artist: Thomas Demand [Online]
 http://channel.tate.org.uk/media/26519199001 [06/12/2011]

Friday, 30 September 2011

German separation visualised



Several Zeit Online data visualization Deutschlandkarte highlighting the German divide. The image above shows that there is only one out of more than one-hundred board members of Dax listed companies is from the former East (Block, 2010a). The maps below show a distribution of first names in East and West based on data from a 1998 phone directory (Block, 2010b), and unmarried parents (Block, 2009).



Block, Jörg (2010a) Deutschlandkarte: Dax-Vorstände [Online]
http://images.zeit.de/lebensart/2010-10/d-karte-44/d-karte-44-thickbox.jpg [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2010b) Deutschlandkarte: Ost-West-Vornamen [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2010/40/Deutschlandkarte-Vornamen [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2009) Deutschlandkarte: Nichteheliche Kinder [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2009/53/Deutschlandkarte-53 [30/09/2011]

Block, Jörg (2010) Deutschlandkarte: Eiscafés [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2010/35/Deutschlandkarte-Eiscafes [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2010) Deutschlandkarte: Drogenfunde [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2010/41/Deutschlandkarte-Drogenfunde [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2010) Deutschlandkarte: Wo wird gearbeitet? [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2010/43/Deutschlandkarte-Arbeit [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2011) Deutschlandkarte: Einkaufen im großen Stil [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2011/18/Deutschlandkarte-Shoppingcenter [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2010) Deutschlandkarte:Wohin es Ausländer zieht [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2010/04/Deutschlandkarte-04 [30/09/2011]
Block, Jörg (2010) Deutschlandkarte: Lottospieler in Deutschland [Online]
 http://www.zeit.de/2010/04/Deutschlandkarte-04 [30/09/2011]

Wednesday, 21 September 2011

Happiness gap between East and West


Is the glass half full?

Happiness Atlas shows people in West German states feel happier. Life satisfaction of men and women in the East are lower than in the West, which the survey claims is caused by the income gap between two regions and higher unemployment in the East. The survey also points out a slightly lower level of health and cultural activity.

Income based

The "Glückslücke" - or the happiness gap - is narrowing, according to the survey. In 1991 East Germany's satisfaction score was 6.0 compared to 7.3 points of the West Germans - the gap of 1.3 points. Today, it stands at its lowest since unification at 0.3.

Deutsche Post AG (2011) DPDHL Glücksatlas [Online] http://www.gluecksatlas.de/cms/index.html [21/09/2011]

Raffelhüschen, Bernd., Moog, Stefan., Vatter, Johannes., Köcher, Renate. & Oswald, Andrew J. (2011) Glücksatlas Deutschland 2011 (2011), p.34. Bonn and Munich: Deutsche Post AG and Albrecht Knaus Verlag. 

Siems, Dorothea (2011) Zufriedenheitsstudie: Vom Glück, ledig zu sein und in Hamburg zu wohnen. [Online]
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13616435/Vom-Glueck-ledig-zu-sein-und-in-Hamburg-zu-wohnen.html [21/09/2011]
The Local/emh (2011) Happiest Germans live in Hamburg. [Online] http://www.thelocal.de/society/20110920-37707.html [21/09/2011]

Saturday, 23 October 2010

The Lost GDR

20 Years Of German Unity by Patrick Chappatte
"On 9 November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down I realised German unification would soon follow, which it did a year later. This meant the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the country in which I was born, grew up, gave birth to my two children, gained my doctorate and enjoyed a fulfilling job as a lecturer in English literature at Potsdam University. Of course, unification brought with it the freedom to travel the world and, for some, more material wealth, but it also brought social breakdown, widespread unemployment, blacklisting, a crass materialism and an "elbow society" as well as a demonisation of the country I lived in and helped shape. Despite the advantages, for many it was more a disaster than a celebratory event." (De la Motte, 2009)
Chappatte, P. (2010) 20 Years Of German Unity. [Online] http://www.globecartoon.com/ [22/10/2010]
De la Motte, B. (2009) East Germans lost much in 1989. [Online] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/08/1989-berlin-wall [22/10/2010]

Friday, 20 August 2010

Borderland interests


http://wapedia.mobi/en/Museums_of_the_inner_German_border

http://europeforvisitors.com/germany/gdr-tourism.htm
http://europeforvisitors.com/germany/potsdam/lindenstrasse-54-55-memorial.htm

Niedersachsen/Sachsen-Anhalt border

Streesow/Schnackenburg/Gartow
http://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=de&tl=en&u=http://www.museum-schnackenburg.de/

Museum opening times
May-Oct
Mon to Fri 10-17
Sat 13-17
Sun and Holidays 10-17

Mar-Apr
Mon-Fri 10-16
Sat-Sun 13-16

Easter
Good Friday: 10-16
Holy Saturday 13-16
Easter Sunday 10-16
Easter Monday 10-16

Landwirtschaftliches Museum Böckwitz mit Grenzausstellung
http://www.museum-boeckwitz.de/

sunday:     1 P.M. - 5 P.M.
mon-sat, holiday: by Agreement
Phone: 03900880045
E-mail: info@museum-boeckwitz.de
€ 2

Museum Burg Brome (closed 2009-2011)
http://www.museen-gifhorn.de/burgbrome/burgbrome_start.html
Geöffnet: März – 2. Advent
Mi – Sa 15 – 17 Uhr
Sonn- u. Feiertage 12 – 18 Uhr
Eintritt € 1,–

Junkerende, 38465 Brome
Telefon (0 58 33) 18 20

Schleswig-Holstein/Mecklenburg-Vorpommern border
http://translate.google.co.uk/translate?js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=1&eotf=1&u=http://grenzausstellung.de/&sl=de&tl=en

Tues, Thurs, Fri and Sun: 14.00-17.00

Priesterkate Büchen - Gudower Straße 1 - 21514 Büchen
Telefon: 04155/6141 - Fax: 04155/3941

the museum in Helmstedt and a preserved section of the border at Hötensleben
http://www.grenzdenkmaeler.de/

Tue 15.00-17.00
Wed 10.00-12.00 and 15.00-17.00

Thu 15.00-18.30
Fri 15.00-17.00
Sat and Sun 10.00-17.00
Monday closed

the former checkpoint on the A2 autobahn near Marienborn
http://www.aidan.co.uk/article_gdr_border_tour.htm


Berlin

1990 – The Path to Unification: An exhibition of the German Historical Museum
6 July 2010 - 10 October 2010 http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/wiedervereinigung/index.html

Unter den Linden 2, 10117 Berlin
Open daily 10 a.m.–6 p.m.
Daily ticket for all exhibitions: 5 €

Leipzig/Halle

Naturkunde und Militärgeschichte der Dübener Heide gemeinnützige GmbH im Militaer-Museum Kossa
Dahlenberger Str. 1
04849 Kossa, bei Söllichau
22.50 €
http://www.bunker-kossa.de/
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,687920-3,00.html

Thursday, 19 August 2010

Otjesd/Leaving


Otjesd/Leaving (2005)
15 min, color, sound

Otjesd (Отъезд) is a short film by Clemens von Wedemeyer, focusing on the immigration of Russians to Germany, an increasing phenomenon seen after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the changes in Eastern Europe. The 15 minute film is filmed in a single shot - and was shown as a continuum at the Kunstmuseum Stuttgart - capturing "an imaginary scene of people waiting for visas in front of the German consulate in Moscow", with the camera follows a young woman trying to enter the building [UbuWeb, 2010]. The Russian dialogues in the original film are "not dubbed or subtitled, creating for the viewer an atmosphere of confusion and disorientation" and "the scene was shot neither at a consulate nor in Moscow, but in a forest near Berlin" [UbuWeb, 2010]. 

UbuWeb [2010] Clemens von Wedemeyer. [Online]
http://www.ubu.com/film/wedemeyer_otjesd.html [19/08/2010]

Shortfilm.de [2010] Clemens von Wedemeyer. [Online]

Wednesday, 4 August 2010

Unification not Complete

"German unification is not complete", Angela Merkel admitted shortly before the 20th anniversary of the Wall's opening (SMD, 2009). Many in Germany still feels "the economic, social and psychological divisions once demarcated by the Wall" and "the country had yet to fulfil promises made when East and West reunited in 1990", claimed CNN (2009).

She has also said that Germany faced "a challenge the likes of which it has not seen since reunification," a reference to the immense costs of raising the social and economic standards in the former East to the levels equivalent to western regions (Dempsey, 2009). 

"In the new (former East German) states we also have far greater structural unemployment than is the case in the old federal republic", claimed the German chancellor, and reunification a "political and economic success for the people in all parts of Germany" even though it has "not yet been achieved in all areas"   (DPA, 2010)

Interior Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, who had been a state secretary for West Germany - and his cousin Lothar de Maiziere was East Germany’s only freely elected premier - argued, "we objectively had too little time, we were driven people". West Germans had taken a "paternalistic stance towards the East — along the lines of 'we know what’s right for our sisters and brothers in the East'", stated de Maiziere, although "in truth, we did not know" (DPA, 2010)

These reports confirm the mentality in Germany, that after 20 years since the Wall was breached and €1.3 trillion (SMD, 2009) later, the social and psychological divide is still evident. 

CNN (2009) Berlin celebrates night that changed world. [Online] 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/11/09/berlin.wall.anniversary/index.html [04/08/2010]
Dempsey, J. (2009) Merkel Says Worst Still Ahead in Germany. [Online] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/global/11debt.html?_r=1 [04/08/2010]
DPA (2010) 20 years on, German reunification still not complete: Merkel. [Online] http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article487380.ece [04/08/2010]
SMD (2009) 20 Years On Berlin Celebrates the Day the Wall Fell. [Online] http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,660134,00.html [04/08/2010]

Thursday, 29 July 2010

Project B-05

The Local
Project B-05
Some of the world’s most prominent modern artists have been brought together in a unique exhibition at complex of Cold War bunkers outside Koblenz. Michael Woodhead reports.
The woods surrounding Montabaur in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate have become an unusual cultural centre for artists. Instead of housing NATO’s nuclear warheads as it once did, a complex of abandoned bunkers is now home to a nascent artist colony. 
Dubbed Project B-05, the centre has even attracted the likes of legendary German director Werner Herzog, who is known to be picky over where his art is shown. His short film on the hellish scenes of burning oil wells after the first Gulf War was the centre piece of the exhibition ‘Traces of the Sun,’ subtitled ‘An Apocalyptic Opera.’
“He was reluctant to allow us to have it at first and asked for a five figure sum,” said the curator Oliver Zybok. “Then when the concept of the bunkers now becoming a centre for art was explained to him it caught his imagination. After all his film is about the horrors of war, so he let us have it for what I can only say was a nominal sum.”
Zybok has also put together the current exhibition ‘Optical Shift – The Pleasure of Illusion and Deception.’
“People said they liked the first two shows which were serious and weighty themes dealing with melancholy and the apocalypse and told us what they now wanted was to have a bit fun. So I had the idea of showing the many aspects of the art of illusion,” he said. 
For the first time at B-05 some twenty artists have been brought together covering an international field. They include Adolf Luther, Thomas Ruff, Anthony McDonald and Bridget Riley.
All play with the notion of deceiving the onlooker into believing what they are seeing when in reality the object of their fascination is not what it appears. For example, the work of Rowena Dring, who studied at Chelsea College of Art and Goldsmiths College, looks like a landscape painting but is in fact an incredible patchwork of thousands of cloth pieces sown together. 
“I grew up in a family of needle workers, so I value the art of sowing and thought of a way of bringing this skill into my art,” she said. “When I began doing this in the late nineties it was actually quite a difficult time to be a painter. I began with patchwork of cottages around my home town in Bedfordshire, which I thought would be amusing to portray.”
Since then her work has become dramatically more complex and intricate. “Without a computer it would be almost impossible to work out the size, shape and colour of each piece,” she said.
The bunkers were part of a network of secret NATO munitions depots, some housing nuclear warheads, built under American supervision, to counter the threat of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. They are so massive that demolishing them was financially ruinous so they were left in place and the entire camp locked and deserted.
“I remembered the camp as a child as a mysterious place in the forest where nobody was allowed to go. And when I returned to Germany after living in Los Angeles for much of my adult life I came and looked having heard it was desolate and dilapidated and nobody had any idea what to do with it apart from let nature run riot,” said Jan Nebgen.
It was on his initiative that led to the creation of B-05, with ‘B’ standing for bunker and ‘05’ the year he had the vision to begin the project. Training as a designer, he had been instrumental in setting up exhibitions in California, which he admits with a smile somehow had, unintentionally, bunkers as a theme.
“It was raining and there was fog,” he said, recalling his first sight of the Montabaur munitions camp. “It felt very eerie as I reached the big main gates and saw the warning sign still there that said you would be shot if you came too close. I went around the site and the bunkers emerged one by one out of the mist still camouflaged and now overgrown with vegetation.”
Through sheer persistence and conviction Nebgen managed to persuade skeptical regional officials in Mainz and Montabaur to allow him to fulfill his dream of a creating an artist’s colony. The state of Rhineland-Palatinate eventually gave the project support through its ministry for education, science and culture.
“I think what appeals to anyone who comes here and everyone I have explained the concept to, is the notion that a place that was once used to store weapons of mass destruction is now a place where we celebrate life and culture instead of human destruction,” he said.
It took almost two years of hard work to clear the undergrowth and renovate the camp. During this time Nebgen persuaded several companies to sponsor the centre. His breakthrough came when Skoda Deutschland agreed to become the lead benefactor and partner.
“Every big city has its museum which makes these bunkers totally different,” said curator Zybok. “The area is perfect for showing every kind of media and here you see art in human and natural setting.” (The Local, 2010)
Optical Shift – Illusion und Täusching: June 27 – October 17, B-05 in Montabaur
Thurs 11:00 am – 6:00 pm; Sat 2:00 pm – 7:00 pm; Sun 11:00 am – 6.00 pm
Admission: €5 adults, €4 pensioners, €3 students
Woodhead, M. (2010) Bunkers Trade NATO Nukes for Art. [Online] http://www.thelocal.de/society/20100625-28107.html?utm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=134 [29/07/2010]

Wednesday, 28 July 2010

Fall of Berlin Wall was a hot moment for conservation - environment - 28 July 2010 - New Scientist


After the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, it was only a matter of time before Germany would be reunified and its internal borders redrawn. Over the following 10 months, one man, Michael Succow seized the moment to set aside large chunks of land as nature reserves.
Propelled into the East German government in its dying days, the peatland ecologist managed to get 4.5 per cent of the state's land set aside as national parks and biosphere reserves. These were East Germany's first protected areas... Succow's historic intervention has now been shown to be part of a general trend: countries tend to set aside vast tracts of land for conservation in "hot moments", rather than building protected areas slowly over time.
...
These hot moments often coincided with periods of dramatic social or political change. For many African countries, this was in the 1960s and 1970s, at the end of the colonial era; in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the peak of activity was in the early 1990s. "Both outgoing and incoming governments are prone to design new protected areas," [Volker] Radeloff told the meeting.
Succow, who had long opposed the East German regime, realised that he had the chance to change history only after he was appointed deputy to environment and water minister Hans Reichelt.
Reichelt, a convinced supporter of the regime, was devastated by its end, but seems to have seen in Succow a chance to correct its dismal environmental record. "He said: 'I have made many mistakes. You must make it better,'" recalls Succow, who was moved into offices in the ministry once occupied by the Stasi secret police and given freedom to employ like-minded colleagues. "In one week, I had a staff of highly motivated people."
On military land, security zones along the border with West Germany and hunting areas set aside for the amusement of the governing elite, Succow's team found that East Germany had jewels of undisturbed biodiversity. A huge chunk was set aside as one of the final acts of its government. And after reunification, other areas prioritised by Succow were also protected, bringing the total to 12 per cent of the land area of the former East Germany.
Radeloff warns that more work is needed to identify the precise combination of circumstances that create hot moments for conservation. He hopes other researchers will study the phenomenon, so that conservationists can effectively target the "when" as well as the "where" of protecting biodiversity. "We need to identify the right moment to strike," he says.
Aldhous, P. (2010) Fall of Berlin Wall was a Hot Moment for Conservation. [Online] http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19233-fall-of-berlin-wall-was-a-hot-moment-for-conservation.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=online-news [28/07/2010]

Is Germany's Left Party a Threat to Democracy?

Siobhán Dowling
A top court in Germany has ruled that the country's domestic intelligence agency may monitor the far-left Left Party. Commentators on Thursday argue that the party may have many failings, but a desire to overthrow democracy isn't one of them.
The far-left Left Party has long strived to rid itself of its pariah status in German politics. Slowly but surely the amalgamation of former East German communists, disaffected former Social Democrats and western German Marxists has turned itself into an important fixture on the political landscape.
In the last national election it garnered 12 percent of the vote, it is the most popular party in eastern Germany, and is in coalitions with the Social Democrats in the regional governments of Berlin and Brandenburg. But at a national level, potential allies still regard it as not fit to govern.
On Wednesday the party suffered a blow to its attempt to forge a more moderate image when a top court ruled that Germany's domestic intelligence agency had the right to monitor a prominent member. The Federal Administrative Court ruled that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) could continue to observe Bodo Ramelow, leader of the Left Party in the eastern state of Thuringia. The agency is charged with observing the activities of those deemed a threat to the constitution, including neo-Nazis and Islamists.
The Left Party is furious to have been tarred with the same brush. While the court noted that it did not believe that Ramelow himself wanted to overthrow the state, it argued that there were extreme-left groupings within the party, such as the Communist Platform or the Marxist Forum, which had anti-constitutional tendencies. The court was also concerned that the party tolerates extreme-left violence. The BfV observation does not include spying but rather allows the agency to monitor Ramelow's public statements and writings. The court also ruled that other members of the party could be similarly observed. (The Left Party is also kept under observation at the state level, but only in some states, mostly in western Germany.)
'Throwback to the Cold War'
Upon hearing the judgement Ramelow said he was "deeply disappointed," adding that this was a "victory for the snooping state." On Thursday he confirmed that he would be appealing the ruling at the Constitutional Court. Speaking to RBB radio he said that the court's decision was "scandalous" and a "throwback to the Cold War."
On Wednesday Ole Schröder, state secretary in the Interior Ministry and a member of the ruling conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), greeted the ruling saying it was a "good day for our well-fortified democracy." The decision was also welcomed by Wolfgang Bosbach, the CDU domestic policy expert. He told the MDR radio station on Thursday that he had never heard the Left Party arguing that the far-right NPD should no longer be observed, "just because the NPD has also been elected to state parliaments in democratic elections."
The view from the left of the political spectrum was somewhat different. Matthias Machning, Thuringia's economy minister and a member of the SPD, called the ruling "absurd," saying that Ramelow was a politician of integrity and a democrat. "Obviously the BfV doesn't have enough to do and is now tilting at windmills."
And Cem Özdemir, co-leader of the Green Party, also leapt to Ramelow's defense. "I find equating the Left Party with the NPD or other extremist parties to be mistaken," he told the Berliner Zeitung. He said that the Left Party was not conspiratorial and even the communists within the party were open about their opinions.
On Thursday the German press take a look at the ruling and most commentators argue that while there may certainly be extreme views within the Left Party, it does not pose a threat to democracy.
Süddeutsche Zeitung
"The NPD is an anti-constitutional party through and through. The Left Party is not. It may well criticize capitalism. But capitalism is not one of the things that the constitution is designed to protect."
"There are indeed strange small groups of Trotskyites, Maoists and other crackpots in the Left Party, but they have hardly any influence. … The BfV should be clever enough not to lump together all of the party. It should concentrate on individuals instead of generalizing. The BfV knows that the Left Party of 2010 is a completely different party to the SED/PDS of 1990."
"One can get annoyed at (Left Party leaders), one can think their policies are half-baked or absurd. But political irritation should not be an excuse to set the people from the BfV on them. Those who denounce the Left Party as anti-democrats in this way should question their own understanding of democracy."
The Financial Times Deutschland
"There are a lot of things one can hold against the Left Party: the self-righteous stance of their top people, their nostalgia for East Germany, their blind faith in the state. But that does not justify by a long shot the decision by the Federal Administrative Court to allow top politicians in the Left Party to be observed by the BfV."
"One can say a lot about Ramelow, (Gregor) Gysi or (Oskar) Lafontaine, but not that they are anti-democrats. They use legitimate methods in election campaigns, on talk shows and in parliaments to promote their controversial views -- and they should only be fought in these arenas too."
"According to the ruling, the Left Party politicians are to be listed alongside neo-Nazis and Islamists in the BfV report. This stigmatization threatens the freedom of the Left Party representatives and their party to take part in the political process unhindered."
Berliner Zeitung
"The decision to allow the observation of Thuringia's Left Party boss Bodo Ramelow is not just wrong, it's abysmal…. There is not one statement by Ramelow from the past that would justify his observation by the BfV. He is regarded, not just within his own party, as a politician with integrity who works very successfully toward changing the balance of power, and certainly not toward overthrowing those in power. And the same can be said for his party."
"There may well be more nutcases in this party than others, including revolutionary dreamers and Stone Age Marxists, but on the whole, no one cannot deny that the Left Party has, for a long time, accepted parliamentarianism, party democracy and the constitutional state. To ignore that is a remarkable failure on the part of the court. It has obviously not understood that there has always been a place within the German constitution for criticism of capitalism."
Frankfurter Allgemeine
"In most states, the party is no longer observed and it is only a matter of time before Germany's remaining states succumb to the charms (of the party). The contradiction whereby the party is seen as extreme in one state but not in the next state will ultimately be resolved by the naive belief that the party has become democratic. Bodo Ramelow's protestations of innocence are emblematic."
Dowling, S. (2010) Is Germany's Left Party a Threat to Democracy? [Online] http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,707888,00.html#ref=nlint [28/07/2010]

Sunday, 18 July 2010

Reiner Klingholz

...we are still a divided country. Because of the emigration of 1.7 million people - mainly young, qualified, and female - from eastern Germany since the fall of the Iron Curtain, which is more than 10 percent of the former population, as well as the enormous drop in the birthrate. This generation is halved, and if you add the emigration of young families, it is even more than half. This generation born in the 1990s will be in the parent age from 2015 on. We will have halved number of newborns again from 2015 on. Of course, this has an enormous effect on schools, infrastructure, and so on.
Between 2015 and 2020, you will have a number of demographic effects in eastern Germany which will put an enormous stress on the system: 50 percent of potential parents, 50 percent of students, 50 percent of job starters. At the same time, you have the baby boomers being pushed into the pension age. That means less people in the workforce, less buying power, and less taxes for the communities. Plus the end of the Solidarity Pact, which runs out in 2019, will mean less transfer money for eastern Germany. 
We are working on a study on the economic future of Europe where we compare 285 regions. There we find that eastern Germany is the demographic crisis area in Europe. There's no other region - including in Romania and Bulgaria - which is affected to such an extent.
Immigration is one alternative, but you still cannot fill the gaps that began thirty years ago. Why do immigrants come? Because there are jobs. The economic situation in eastern Germany does not cry that much for immigration. The second thing is that the experience with immigration is not that high, so you don't have that many foreigners. Foreigners like to come to places where you already have clusters of Turks, Indians, Pakistanis, and so on. If you don't have the clusters, there's no real attraction for others. 
The third thing is that the openness for foreigners is not very expressed in eastern Germany, so this tolerance is not around. It doesn't make it very attractive for clever Indians to come if they read in the papers that Indian people are beaten up. All this is pretty tough, I would say. (Klingholz, in Wish, 2008) 
An article highlighting the divided society of Germany, still affected by the economic and political systems that created the gap, and continues to influence people's lives today.

Wish, V. (ed.) (2008) Germany Demographic Profile Part 6: "We Are Still a Divided Country". [Online] http://knowledge.allianz.com/en/globalissues/demographic_change/country_profiles/germany_demographic_profile_klingholz.html [18/07/2010] 

How the East Was Lost

Alexander Neubacher and Michael Sauga
Spiegel Online


July 1 marks the 20th anniversary of the introduction of the deutsche mark in East Germany in the runup to full reunification. But the economic benefits that West German politicians promised failed to materialize. What went wrong?
German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, 56, is from Bonn, deep in the west of Germany, but his memories of the days between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990 are those of an East German.
Lothar de Maizière, the first and last democratically elected prime minister of East Germany, had asked his cousin whether he wanted a job. Thomas de Maizière agreed, moved into an office on Klosterstrasse in East Berlin and, from then on, sat on the side of the table reserved for East Germans at the negotiations on German reunification.
Thomas de Maizière has often asked himself what went wrong at the time. "Objectively speaking, we didn't have enough time. We were under a great deal of pressure," he says. He compares it to a "sudden political birth."
The emergency delivery happened exactly 20 years ago. Today, as the federal government's commissioner for the "new German states" (as the former East Germany is known), de Maizière's job is to promote the development of eastern Germany. He is the first interior minister and the first West German in a long time to hold the position, but de Maizière downplays his role.
The minister remains reserved in interviews on the subject. And when he does say something, it doesn't sound like what his predecessors said.
He has an aversion to official phrases like "harmonization of living conditions in the east and west." Nor is he keen on the term "Aufbau Ost" ("development of the east"), which German governments have used as shorthand for efforts to promote economic development in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), as East Germany was officially known. "When people from western Germany come to Potsdam, Dresden or Stralsund," he says, referring to three relatively prosperous eastern German cities, "their first impressions prompt them to ask: 'What still needs to be developed here?'"

Overnight Change
It was 20 years ago that then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl made a lonely decision. The Berlin Wall had come down, and thousands of East German citizens were moving to the West every week. Kohl offered Hans Modrow, the interim communist leader of East Germany at the time, a monetary union for the two Germanys. Experts were annoyed by the proposal, and Karl Otto Pöhl, the then-head of West Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, warned against it. But Kohl had his way. Money transporters began rolling eastward overnight. The West German deutsche mark was named East Germany's currency on July 1, 1990.
Politically speaking, the monetary union was a success. The people were delighted, because they no longer had to travel to the west to get deutsche marks. But the move had a devastating effect on the economy. Overnight, all pensions, wages and savings of up to 6,000 East German marks were exchanged on a one-to-one basis. This was beneficial for East German citizens but not for businesses, many of which went under when they suddenly found themselves having to compete with the highly modern West German economy.
"Although there was no reasonable political alternative to the fixed exchange rate, it was a bad move economically," says de Maizière. "Instead of one to one, the exchange rate should have been one to three or one to four, to reflect the economic reality, but this would have had the devastating political consequence of further migration."

Lagging Behind the West
Today, the eastern German economy is still in a sorry state, and there are no indications that the situation will change. An estimated €1.3 trillion ($1.6 trillion) have flowed from the former West Germany to the former East Germany over the last 20 years. But what has that money achieved? Historic neighborhoods have been restored, new autobahns built and the telephone network brought up to date, but most of the money was spent on social benefits such as welfare payments. The anticipated economic upswing failed to materialize.
Some eastern cities, like Leipzig, Dresden, Jena and Erfurt, have experienced economic development. The state of Thuringia has a relatively robust auto industry, and there are successful high-tech companies in Saxony. Research institutes and universities are doing well, thanks in part to generous government subsidies.
But the success stories are rare. Most of eastern Germany has turned into an economically depressed region that lags behind the west in all respects:
The per capita economic output in the east is only at 71 percent of the western level, with a disproportionately high share of economic output attributable to the public sector. The economic output generated by the private economy is only at 66 percent of the western level.
To close the gap, the eastern German economy would have to grow more rapidly than in western Germany, but precisely the opposite is the case. Germany's leading economic research institutes expect the economy in eastern Germany to grow by 1.1 percent this year, compared with 1.5 percent in the west.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the population of eastern Germany has declined by almost 2 million people, a trend that is continuing unabated.
The proportion of household income derived from welfare payments is 20 percent higher in the east than in the west.
Of Germany's 100 largest industrial companies and 100 largest service providers, not one has its headquarters in eastern Germany.
Politicians across the political spectrum tend to sugarcoat the meager economic results of reunification. Chancellor Angela Merkel, the leader of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), is fond of saying that "a great deal has been achieved" in the development of the east. Former Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), who is also a former commissioner in charge of developing eastern Germany, says jubilantly: "We have successfully made it three-quarters of the way."
"We are firmly convinced that the creative forces of the people that have now been unleashed will lead to a new Wirtschaftswunder," then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl proclaimed on June 5, 1990, referring to the "economic miracle" of postwar West Germany. But anyone who travels through eastern Germany today, 20 years later, will encounter failed mega-projects, depopulated downtown areas and many people who haven't had a regular job in two decades.

Neubacher, A. & Sauga, M. (2010) Germany's Disappointing Reunification: How the East Was Lost. [Online] http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,703802,00.html#ref=nlint [16/07/2010]

Saturday, 17 July 2010

Germany: still divided after all these years

Another article about the division of German society, which could be translated into failure of the unification policies.


Sabine Reul
12 November 2009

The fall of the Berlin Wall, far from heralding a unified future, ushered in a new period of discord between west and east.
Twenty years ago, the implosion of Stalinism in Europe and the end of German partition were celebrated as a triumph for democracy and freedom. The Iron Curtain fell, the East German party dictatorship and shortage economy were vanquished and, as in the rest of Eastern Europe, pluralist party democracy and market economies prevailed. In what was the German Democratic Republic, the enthusiasm was especially marked. The spectacular uprising of eastern Germans had dealt the final blow to the Stalinist order across Eastern Europe,  seemingly ending the division not just of Germany, but of the continent, too.
But this enthusiasm was shortlived. The mood of renewal in 1989/90 soon gave way to disappointment and new insecurities. This applied not only in Germany, but across Eastern Europe, where market and multi-party systems were established at different speeds during the 1990s. Everywhere, a short period of euphoria was followed by long-term disillusionment. And everywhere, the transformation was soon characterised, at least temporarily, by the growth of right-wing and nationalist trends that cast a shadow over the newly won freedoms.
In Germany, the turning point came in 1991 with the pogroms in the former East German city of Hoyerswerda that sent disconcerting images of violence against immigrants around the world. Anti-foreigner violence had been an almost daily occurrence in West Germany throughout the 1980s, and the Hoyerswerda pogroms were followed by similar events in the western German cities of Solingen and Mölln. However, it was Hoyerswerda that acquired special importance. For western Germans they became a symbol of a new sense of estrangement from, if not disdain for, their eastern fellow Germans and a reference point for therapeutically oriented discussions about the ‘problems’ of German unification that continue to this day.
The big difference between the transformation in eastern Germany and the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries is that, in Germany, the confrontation between the western market and eastern state socialist life worlds was politicised in a form specific to Germany. Put simply, during the Cold War, Germans were politically divided, but did not feel estranged in human terms. That only happened once the country was reunited, ironically. And this sense of difference was promoted and institutionalised by the way western German politicians and opinion-formers soon began to rationalise the economic and social dislocation brought about by the process of market transformation in the east.
The notion that eastern Germans were somehow ‘different’ gained momentum only a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. The western German left played a particularly sorry role in this regard. Otto Schily, later minister of the interior in the Social Democratic (SPD)/Green coalition government under Gerhard Schröder from 1998-2005, quit the Greens to joint the SPD in November 1989. He recommended himself to his new party colleagues by a remarkable television performance. When asked, after the last elections to the GDR parliament in March 1990, why so many people in the east had voted for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), he silently held a banana into the camera. And in preparation for the first national elections of the united country in December the same year, Oskar Lafontaine, then SPD candidate for the chancellery, banked on mobilising western fears of the economic consequences of German unity in his fight against the then-incumbent chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU).
While Schily expressed unabashed contempt for eastern German desires for a modest share in western prosperity, Lafontaine played the other side of the same card, stoking fears that economic transformation in the east and labour migration from there would put a big dent into accustomed western living standards. This was the welcome given to the people who had just overthrown the Honecker regime by the SPD – along with the groupings on the radical left who more or less unanimously misconstrued the fall of the Berlin Wall as an expansionist capitalist conspiracy to conquer the east and disparaged eastern ‘consumerism’. That Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU in turn tried to recharge the stuttering batteries of German conservatism with the images of the popular pro-market uprising in the GDR was a comparatively harmless political manoeuvre. Nonetheless, taken together, the effect from the start was to saddle the process of unification with the degenerate political impulses of the decaying western party system.
The Democratic Awakening (Demokratischer Aufbruch) party, east German proponents of unification, quite sensibly wanted to prevent eastern opposition groupings being lost amidst the western political parties. Commenting on the left-right divide in the western German parliamentary system, the DA leadership declared in January 1990: ‘We regard this distinction as a myth, as an ideological illusion.’ (1) But despite such rhetoric, the December 1990 elections saw the different strands of the GDR opposition dissolve themselves virtually without trace into the western German parties. Inevitable as that was, since none of them presented an alternative strategic vision, it nonetheless meant that the experience of 40 years of GDR history and the popular uprising in which it had just culminated found no place in the political universe of the united Germany. Eastern Germans had to make do with the imported western party machines, themselves clearly showing signs of political exhaustion. Given their decrepit state it is perhaps unsurprising that the old GDR state party, renamed first the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and then, since 2005, Die Linke, soon made a stunning recovery. And it is equally unsurprising that opinion surveys show that eastern Germans doggedly express high regard for democracy in the abstract, but not for its currently practiced form.
The political unification of Germany, consummated on 3 October 1990, entailed a certain institutional imbalance from the start. This encouraged eastern Germans, who had just enjoyed the liberating experience of collective political action, to regard themselves as passive objects of economic and social transformation. To make things worse, Chancellor Kohl’s government proved incapable of giving the concept of unification a positive meaning beyond stilted phrases. Eastern Germans joined a tired republic. As a result, the great historical moment that could have sparked a real sense of social renewal remained strangely flat. Without lasting power, this exceptional moment was soon lost to the machinery of administrative restructuring and adjustment processes. This highlights a truth generally ignored in debates about the problems of German unification: the progress of German unity could only be as politically and culturally dynamic as the society – and the political order – in which the eastern Germans found themselves 20 years ago.
The trouble was that the intellectual, political exhaustion of western party politics, both left and right, meant that the difference in life experience between eastern and western Germans became politicised. Hostility to materialism among the western left, which had long exchanged its former affinity with working-class politics for ‘post-conventional values’, inevitably struck the eastern ‘workerly society’, as the sociologist Wolfgang Engler described the GDR, as exceedingly odd. In a society that, as Engler wrote, ‘attributed exceptional importance to work, whether loved or unloved, for people’s personal lives’, people had been accustomed to ‘clothe their critique of social conditions in the silent demonstration of workerly virtues’ (2). The productively employed Werktätige were the sole moral authority of GDR society. That some western parties viewed their eastern compatriots’ aspiration for modest prosperity and functioning factories with at best incomprehension, and at worst derision, further undermined understanding between east and west.
The same applied to the other side of the political spectrum. For the best part of the past 20 years, the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU made up for their lack of a future-oriented politics by indulging in a more or less incessant rant against the loathsome features of the long defunct GDR. This was partly an ill-conceived attempt to draw dividends from Cold War anti-communism, and partly a reaction to discontent with ‘really existing’ eastern German capitalism, which proved rather less dynamic and prosperous than originally expected once the shortlived unification boom was over. Here, too, a defensive political reflex generated east-west discord. The simplistic formula of anti-socialist rhetoric, according to which life in the GDR had consisted of nothing but the oppression of ‘victims’ by ‘perpetrators’, simply did not square with the real life experience of eastern Germans before 1989. That experience naturally also included other things like a sense of shared destiny, a partly ironical distance from the GDR regime, and certain opportunities for self-assertion that a western-style market economy does not always provide workers with.
As the Bulgarian sociologist Ivan Krastev notes in a recent article, even members of the state elite in Eastern European countries had to befriend their greengrocer, because he decided who got what. The greengrocer may have been formally powerless, but still had a certain informal power (3). At exactly the same time as the market destroyed social networks that had once provided people with at least a certain sense of orientation and self-esteem, eastern Germans were being accused of being mentally contaminated by their totalitarian past. That, too, could only promote anger and a sense of estrangement. And it is therefore not surprising to learn that eastern Germans now often say things had not really been ‘quite that bad’.
The handwringing with which experts in academia and social research often respond to utterances of this kind betrays a lack of understanding of the forces at play. It was because of the ideological vacuum at the heart of western politics at the turn of the century that simple differences in life experience in east and west acquired the form of politicised misunderstanding. In the process, the debate about German unity has taken the form of a rather degraded obsession with the eastern German ‘mentality’. The focus on eastern ‘difference’ has given rise to an entire research industry that has probed the souls of the new German citizens. It did occasionally bring forth comedic moments of pseudo-Freudian insight such as the famous ‘potty thesis’ of the criminologist Christian Pfeiffer. He argued that anti-foreigner sentiment among eastern German youth was a late consequence of socialist kindergarten education.
During the past 15 years, innumerable studies have diagnosed a high level of dissatisfaction with economic and political development as well as an increased tendency among eastern Germans to view certain features of the GDR favourably. Given the situation described, these findings are not at all surprising. But what is notable is that more recent studies have shown that the difference between east and west as regards the level of dissatisfaction with social and political trends has narrowed considerably – without this having so far had any noticeable impact on the firmly established notion that eastern Germans are somehow ‘different’. As the sociologist Claus Leggewie recently noted, survey data presents ‘a rather undramatic picture of the situation between east and west which, in view of current discourse, is the real sensation’ (4). Nonetheless, the media continue propagating the image of the easterner as the ‘other’ with derogatory neologisms like Ostalgie (eastalgia) and Jammerossi (moan-easterner), thereby attributing to the eastern psyche responsibility for all the real and imagined ills in the united Germany. A kind of ethnisation has taken hold of the German political imagination – with the doubly unfortunate effect that reality becomes progressively even less comprehensible than it already appears, and that understanding between eastern and western Germans is undermined.
However, 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this period of construed difference may hopefully be drawing to a close. The new generation of young Germans now starting out on their training or working lives have no living memory of the divided Germany. The high level of cross-migration between both parts of the country ensures that personal contact mitigates the impact of prejudice and politicised misunderstanding. And, last but not least, the now shared experience of economic crisis and political stagnation might become the source of a new sense of common identity and purpose. Yet this is only likely to happen to the extent that a sense of otherness gives way to a focus on real life experience.
(1) Unsere Revolution. Die Geschichte der Jahre 1989/90, Erhart Neubert, Piper München 2009
(2) Die Ostdeutschen als Avantgarde, Wolfgang Engler, Aufbau Verlag Berlin 2002
(3) The Greengrocer’s Revenge, Ivan Krastev, Prospect, Oktober 2009
(4) ‘Veröstlichung oder: Vom Zäsur- zum Differenzbewusstsei’, Claus Leggewie, included in Neues Deutschland. Eine Bilanz der deutschen Wiedervereinigung, Eckart Jesse and Eberhard Sandschneider (eds), Nomos Freiburg 2008


Reul, S. (2009) Germany: still divided after all these years. [Online] 
http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/7694/ [17/07/2010]

Friday, 16 July 2010

Despite Privacy Inquiries, Germans Flock to Google, Facebook and Apple

Perhaps it's a trend that people have less concern about private information being shared publically.


Kevin O'Brien
11 July 2010
New York Times
...

American technology companies are under close scrutiny in Germany. Google is being investigated for having errantly collected personal Internet information like e-mail passwords while doing research for its Street View mapping service.

Facebook is being investigated for collecting data on non-Facebook users from the mailing lists of active users. And Apple has been asked to explain what kind of information its latest iPhone 4 is storing on users and for how long.

Johannes Caspar, a data protection supervisor in Hamburg who is conducting the investigations into Google and Facebook, said his agency was trying to protect consumers from themselves. “The problem is that many people are unaware what is being done with their data,” he said.

Strict privacy laws are a product of the post-World War II reconstruction, when German lawmakers restricted the use of personal information to prevent the government from singling out citizens and persecuting them.

It is illegal, for example, to publish the image or name of any private person without permission. This includes felons, who are usually identified in the media by the initial of their last name only, like Klaus P.

That has not stopped Germans from flocking to a social networking site or downloading the latest smartphone applications.

As of May, Googe controlled 92 percent of the online search market in Germany, compared with 65 percent in the United States, according to comScore, a research firm in Reston, Va.

Facebook has about 7.7 million users in Germany (which has a population of about 82 million), according to Inside Network, a research group in Palo Alto, Calif. All versions of the iPhone, including the iPhone 4, which went on sale in Germany in June, have sold out within days. Apple does not provide specific sales figures in Germany.

...


The American practice of selling customer names and details, Mr. Haas said, is legal in Germany but almost never used because “it would erode the trust we have built up.”

Yet more and more Germans are disclosing personal details if they can save money doing so. A retail bonus card, called Payback, has 19.4 million subscribers. In exchange for discounts at retailers, cardholders give Payback’s operator, Loyalty Partner of Munich, permission to send them offers.

The company scored a legal victory in August 2008 when the German supreme court, the Bundesgerichtshof, rejected a complaint from consumer protection officials who had claimed that Payback did not tell consumers enough about how it used their personal information in marketing efforts.

Dieter Weng, the president of the German Dialogue Marketing Association, a group of 800 businesses that includes online marketers, said Germany was unlikely to loosen its privacy restrictions.

But the need to encourage the growth of the Internet economy, Mr. Weng said, could help lower barriers for online marketing.

“I think Germans are concerned about personal data being misused by government or law enforcement,” Mr. Weng said. “But for behavioral or attitudinal data about customer preferences, people are more willing to share if they see an advantage in it for them.”


O'Brien, K. (2010) Despite Privacy Inquiries, Germans Flock to Google, Facebook and Apple. [Online] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/technology/12disconnect.html?_r=1&ref=technology [14/07/2010]

Villa Schöningen: A Cold War Museum



The permanent display galleries house a historical exhibition on the story of the Glienicke Bridge during the Cold War. In the exhibition the horror of totalitarian regimes is made perceptible... In addition to the permanent exhibition on German history in the Cold War, Villa Schöningen will host temporary exhibitions of contemporary art. The idea is to show art, which deals with issues related to the place, such as the Cold War, German division and reunification, 1989, totalitarianism, democracy and freedom [Villa Schöningen: A Cold War Museum, 2010].


OPENING HOURS
Thursday and Friday 11:00 - 18:00
Saturday and Sunday 10:00 - 18:00

SCULPURE GARDEN
Tuesday to Sunday 11:00 - 21:00

Berliner Str. 86 14467 Potsdam
From Potsdam train station: Tram 93
From Berlin: S-Bahn S1 or S7 to Wannsee Bhf, Bus 316 to Glienicker Brücke


Villa Schöningen: A Cold War Museum [2010]



Moore, M. (2009) Germany Celebrates Memory of Berlin Wall Falling with Museum Opening and Memorials
http://www.artdaily.org/index.asp?int_sec=11&int_new=34184 [14/07/2010]

Bunker Museum, near Bonn
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3157806,00.html [16/07/2010]